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INTRODUCTION 
 
In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano1, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
respondents, a class of investors who purchased Matrixx securities on the national market 
between October 22, 2003, and February 6, 2004 (the “Class Period”), had adequately alleged a 
claim under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-53, based on the petitioner pharmaceutical company’s alleged 
                                                 
1 563 U.S. _____ (2011) 
2 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b) 
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(2010) 
failure to disclose “adverse event reports”4 associated with the homeopathic cold remedy Zicam, 
despite the fact that these reports did not constitute a statistically significant number of adverse 
events.   
The Court, in a unanimous decision, declined to adopt a bright-line rule that “reports of 
adverse events associated with a pharmaceutical company’s products cannot be material absent a 
significant number of such reports.5 Instead, applying the “total mix” standard articulated in 
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson6, the Court concluded that “assessing the materiality of adverse event 
reports is a ‘fact-specific’ inquiry that requires consideration of the source, content, and context 
of the reports.7  The Court concurred with the Ninth Circuit in holding that in the instant case, 
respondents had adequately pleaded materiality.8  Additionally, the Court held that the 
respondents had adequately plead the scienter required for a successful 10b-5 claim, assuming 
without deciding that the “deliberate recklessness” standard applied by the Ninth Circuit was 
sufficient to establish scienter.9  The Court stated that “[t]he inference that Matrixx acted 
recklessly (or intentionally, for that matter) is at least as compelling, if not more compelling, than 
the inference that it simply thought the reports did not indicate anything meaningful about 
adverse reactions.”10   
                                                 
4 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a) (2010).  The FDA defines an “[a]dverse drug experience” as “[a]ny adverse event 
associated with the use of a drug in humans, whether or not considered drug related.”  During the Class Period, 
Matrixx was not required to disclose adverse event reports to the FDA, as Zicam Cold Remedy was sold as an over-
the-counter drug.  In 2006, Congress enacted legislation that required manufacturers of nonprescription drugs to 
report “any report received of a serious adverse event associated with such drug.”  21 U.S.C. §§379aa(b), (c).  The 
FDA has defined a “serious adverse event” as “[a]ny adverse drug experience occurring at any dose that results in 
any of the following outcomes: Death, a life-threatening adverse drug experience, inpatient hospitalization or 
prolongation of existing hospitalization, a persistent or significant disability/incapacity, or a congenital 
anomaly/birth defect.”  21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a)(2010).   
5 Matrixx, 563 U.S. _____, at 11 (2011).   
6 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) 
7 Matrixx, 563 U.S. _____, at 15 (2011).   
8 Id. at 16.   
9 Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc, 585 F.3d. 1167, 1180 (2009).   
10 Matrixx, 563 U.S. _____, at 21. 
 Part One of this paper will trace the factual and procedural background of this case as it 
progressed to being heard by the Court.  Part Two will discuss the general legal principles of 
materiality and scienter in the context of securities fraud class actions, as well as analyze adverse 
event reporting and statistical significance.  Part Three will discuss the opinion rendered by the 
Court in detail, and in particular the reasons why the Court declined to establish a bright-line rule 
in this area of securities litigation.  Part Four will conclude by analyzing the impact of this 
decision on future securities fraud litigation, and discuss the potential problems for both drug 
manufacturers and investors that may arise from this decision.   
I.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The class of investors in Matrixx alleged the following facts in their complaint, which the 
lower courts assumed to be true in the context of deciding a motion to dismiss.11  Matrixx 
Initiatives, Inc. (“Matrixx”) is a pharmaceutical company that sells over-the-counter cold remedy 
products through a wholly-owned subsidiary, Zicam, LLC.  One of the products sold during the 
Class Period was Zicam Cold Remedy, which was sold as a nasal spray and gel.  The active 
ingredient in Zicam Cold Remedy was zinc gluconate.12  Respondents alleged that Zicam Cold 
Remedy accounted for approximately 70 percent of Matrixx’s sales.13 
During the Class period, Matrixx made a series of statements relating to revenues and 
product safety that respondents claimed were misleading in light of reports that Matrixx had 
received, but did not disclose, of users of Zicam who suffered anosmia (loss of sense of smell) 
after using the product.   
                                                 
11 See Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1959 (2009) (“To survive a motion to 
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”) 
12 Matrixx, 563 U.S. ____, at 2.   
13 Id. 
A.  The Reports 
 
In 1999, the neurological director of the Smell & Taste Research Foundation, Ltd., called 
Matrixx’s customer to report that several of his patients had developed anosmia after using 
Zicam, including at least one that did not have a cold but nonetheless used Zicam and developed 
the condition.  In 2002, Matrixx received a complaint from a user of Zicam who had developed 
anosmia, and contacted the user’s treating physician at the University of Colorado Health 
Sciences Center.  Timothy Clarot, Matrixx’s vice president for research and development, 
informed the physician of similar complaints from other customers.  The physician, Dr. 
Linschoten, informed Clarot that previous studies had linked zinc sulfate to the loss of smell.  
Clarot indicated that he was not aware of the studies, and also stated that Matrixx had not 
performed its own studies on Zicam, but had hired a consultant to review the product.  Dr. 
Linschoten sent Clarot abstracts of the studies from the 1930’s and 1980’s that she had referred 
to, which confirmed zinc’s toxicity.  Clarot contacted Dr. Linschoten again to ask if she would 
participate in animal studies that Matrixx planned, but the physician declined.   
In 2003, Dr Linschoten, in collaboration with Dr. Jafek from the University of Colorado 
(who had observed 10 patients that had developed anosmia after Zicam use), planned to present 
their findings to the American Rhinologic society in a presentation originally titled “Zicam 
Induced Anosmia”, which presented the case study of a man who developed anosmia after using 
Zicam.   The Society published an abstract prior to the meeting.14 Matrixx sent a letter to Dr. 
Jafek warning him that he did not have permission to use the name of Matrixx or the names of 
Matrixx products, prompting Jafek to delete references to Zicam in his presentation.   
                                                 
14 Id. at 4.  See also “Conference Schedule of the American Rhinological Society, September 20, 2003”, available at 
http://app.american-rhinologic.org/programs/2003ARSFallProgram071503.pdf.   
Finally, by the end of the Class Period, nine plaintiffs had filed four products liability 
lawsuits against Matrixx, alleging that Zicam had impaired their sense of smell.15   
B.  The Alleged Misleading Statements 
 
In October 2003, after Dr. Jafek’s presentation to the American Rhinological Society, 
Matrixx stated that Zicam “was poised for growth in the upcoming cough and cold season” and 
that the company had “very strong momentum.”16  Matrixx also stated that it expected revenues 
would “be up in excess of 50% and that earnings, per share for the full year [would] be in the 25 
to 30 cent range.”17  In January 2004, Matrixx estimated even higher residues, predicting an 
increase in revenues of 80 percent and earnings per share in the range of 33 to 38 cents.18 
In Zicam’s 10-Q filing with the SEC in November 2003, Zicam listed several materially 
adverse effects that could result from products liability actions, including a negative effect on 
Matrixx’s “product branding and goodwill.”19  However, it did not disclose that at least one 
product’s liability suit alleging that Zicam caused anosmia had been filed. 
On February 2, 2004, Matrixx responded to a Dow Jones Newswire report that stated that the 
FDA was “looking into complaints that an over-the-counter common-cold medicine 
manufactured by a unit of Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. . . . may be causing some users to lose their 
sense of smell.”20  Matrixx’s response, in the form of a press release, stated: 
All Zicam products are manufactured and marketed according to FDA guidelines for 
homeopathic medicine.  Our primary concern is the health and safety of our customers 
and the distribution of factual information about our products.  Matrixx believes 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Christensen v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., No. 03-cv-0146, Docket No 3. (W.D. Mich 2003); Nelson v. 
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., et al., No. YC048136 (Cal. Super. Ct. - Los Angeles); Sutherland v. Matrixx Initiatives, 
Inc., et al., No. CV2003-1635-WHR (Ala. Cir. Ct. - Etowah); Bentley, et al. v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., et al., No. 
CV2004-001338 (Ariz. Super. Ct. - Maricopa) 
16 Matrixx, 566 U.S., at 4. 
17 Id. at 5. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id.   
statements alleging that intranasal Zicam products caused anosmia (loss of smell) are 
completely unfounded and misleading.   
In no clinical trial of intranasal zinc gluconate gel products has there been a single report 
of lost or diminished olfactory function (sense of smell).  Rather, the safety and efficacy 
of zinc gluconate for the treatment of symptoms related to the common cold have been 
well established in two double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized clinical trials.  In 
fact, in neither study were there any reports of anosmia related to the use of this 
compound.  The overall incidence of adverse events associated with zinc gluconate was 
extremely low, with no statistically significant difference between the adverse event rates 
for the treated and placebo subsets. 
A multitude of environmental and biologic influences are known to affect the sense of 
smell.  Chief among them is the common cold.  As a result, the population most likely to 
use cold remedy products is already at increased risk of developing anosmia.  Other 
common causes of olfactory dysfunction include age, nasal and sinus infections, head 
trauma, anatomical obstructions, and environmental irritants.21 
 On the last day of the Class Period, February 6, 2004, Matrixx issued a substantially 
similar press release in response to a Good Morning America television segment that reported Dr. 
Jafek’s findings, specifically that Dr. Jafek had discovered more than a dozen patients suffering 
from anosmia after using Zicam, and that four products-liability lawsuits had been filed against 
Matrixx.22  Following the Class Period, Matrixx made statements in an Form 8-K filing stating 
that it had convened a panel of doctors and scientists to review the current scientific evidence 
related to zinc gluconate’s effect on users’ sense of smell.  Matrixx stated to a reporter a few 
weeks later that it would begin conducting human and animal studies on Zicam.   
C. Procedural History 
 
1. The District Court Decision 
 
On April 27, 2004, respondents filed a class action against Matrixx and three directors and 
officers individually on behalf of investors who purchased Matrixx securities during the Class 
Period, alleging that the price of Matrixx common stock plummeted in response to the Dow 
Jones Report and Good Morning America segment, eventually incurring a one-day drop on the 
                                                 
21 Id. at 5-6, see also “Matrixx Initiatives Reaffirms Safety of Intranasal Zicam ® Cold Remedy”, February 6, 2004, 
available at http://integratir.com/newsrelease.asp?news=2130823539&ticker=MTXX, (last visited March 27, 2011). 
22 Id. at 6.   
last day of the Class Period of 23.8% on unusually heavy trading volume.23  The District Court 
for the District of Arizona dismissed the complaint without prejudice, stating that the allegations 
concerning adverse event reports were not material because they were not statistically significant, 
and further that plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege scienter.24 
The District Court went on to state that any amendment would be futile “[a]bsent allegations 
Defendants knew there was a definitive and statistically significant link between Zicam and 
anosmia during the Class Period that was ‘sufficiently serious and frequent to affect future 
earnings.”25  The District Court relied on the standard used by the Second Circuit in In Re 
Carter-Wallace, Inc. Securities Litigation (“Carter-Wallace I”)26 and In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. 
Securities Litigation (“Carter-Wallace II”)27 in making its determination.   In Carter-Wallace I, 
the Second Circuit held that the defendant drug-manufacturer’s failure to disclose deaths related 
to its drug was not materially misleading “until Carter-Wallace had information that Felbatol had 
caused a statistically significant number of . . . deaths and therefore had reason to believe that the 
commercial viability of Felbatol was threatened.28 Carter-Wallace II expanded this rationale to 
encompass the scienter requirement of 10b-5, stating that “it was not reckless for Carter-Wallace 
to consider the adverse event reports to be random.  Not only were the financial statements not 
materially misleading before the link could be made, but any inference of scienter was negated as 
well.”29   
2. The Ninth Circuit Decision 
 
                                                 
23 Siracusano, 585 F.3d at XXX 
24 Id. 
25 Id.   
26 150 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1998) 
27 220 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 200) 
28 150 F.3d at 157.   
29 220 F.3d. at 41. 
The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the adoption of the rule from Carter-Wallace, instead 
adhering to the rationale of In Re Pfizer Inc. Securities Litigation30and holding that a district 
court “cannot determine as a matter of law whether such links were statistically insignificant 
because statistical significance is a question of fact.”31  The Court then engaged in “the fact-
specific inquiry required by Basic.”32  The Court concluded that the allegations made by the class 
were sufficient to allege materiality under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
The Court then addressed the scienter requirement of the PSLRA, which requires that a 
complaint “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required state of mind.”33 A “strong inference” was defined in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor 
Issues & Rights, Ltd. as requiring that a “plaintiff alleging fraud under § 10(b) . . . must plead 
facts rendering an inference of scienter at least as likely as any plausible opposing inference.”34 
Scienter has only been sufficiently plead if “a reasonable person would deem the inference of 
scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the 
facts alleged.”35  If no one of the alleged statements, standing along, creates a strong inference of 
scienter, the Court must “conduct a ‘holistic’ review” of all of the alleged misstatements, in order 
“to determine whether the insufficient allegations combine to create a strong inference of 
intentional conduct or deliberate recklessness.”36 Important to the Court’s decision was the 9th 
Circuit’s definition of deliberate recklessness, which included “an extreme departure from the 
standards of ordinary care.”37  The Court, after review of the misleading statements listed above, 
                                                 
30 584 F.Supp. 2d 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
31 Siracusano, 585 F.3d at X (quoting In Re Pfizer, 584 F.Supp at 635-36).   
32 Id. at X 
33 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(2010). 
34 551 U.S. 308, 310 (2007). 
35 Id. 
36 Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2009).   
37 In Re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hollinger v. Titan Capital 
Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990)(en banc)).   
found that the holistic review of the complaint supported an inference of scienter that was 
“cogent and at least as compelling” as any “plausible non-culpable explanation.”38  Specifically 
the Court stated that “[w]ithholding reports of adverse effects of and lawsuits concerning the 
product responsible for the company’s remarkable sales is ‘an extreme departure from the 
standards of ordinary care’ and ‘presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers.’39 
3. The Supreme Court Decision 
 
Perhaps curiously, the opinion in Matrixx spends most of its time discussing the 
materiality of the alleged misstatements or omissions.  Not surprisingly, the Court declined to 
adopt a bright-line rule regarding statistical significance, stating that to adopt such a rule would 
“ ‘artificially exclud[e]’ information that “would otherwise be considered significant to the 
trading decision of a reasonable investor.”40  The Court adopted the position of the SEC and 
other amici that statistical significance is not the only reliable measure of causation.41 “Given 
that medical professionals and regulators act on the basis of evidence of causation that is not 
statistically significant, it stands to reason that in certain cases reasonable investors would as 
well.”42 The Court stated that, perhaps unhelpfully, that the mere existence of adverse event 
reports, numbering in toto into the hundreds of thousands per year43, does not compel disclosure; 
“something more is needed, but that something is not limited to statistical significance.”44  
                                                 
38 Siracusano, XXXX  
39 Id., quoting Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324.   
40 Matrixx, 563 U.S. at 11, quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 236.   
41 Id.  at 11-12.  The Court noted specifically that statistically significant data is not always available, that ethical 
considerations sometimes prevent researchers from conducting randomized clinical trials, and, perhaps most 
importantly for the member of the products liability defense bar, that medical experts rely on other evidence to 
establish an inference of causation.  Defense attorneys looking for a bright-line rule in this case, ready to be plucked 
and exported to the next Daubert challenge, were undoubtedly disappointed, if unsurprised.   
42 Id. at 15. 
43 See FDA, Safety Alerts for Human Medical Products, 
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch/SafetyInformation/SafetyAlertsforHumanMedicalProducts/ucm196258.htm. 
44Matrixx, 561 U.S. at 16. 
II.   GENERAL PRINCIPLES:  10B-5 ACTIONS, PSLRA, TWOMBLY/IQBAL 
 
Part Two of this paper will set forth the general legal principles that provide the backdrop for 
the Matrixx decision.  In particular, the general federal pleading standards established in Bell 
Atlantic Corp v. Twombly45, and Ashcroft v. Iqbal46, will be contrasted with pleading standards 
established by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.47  But before discussion of 
the specific pleading standards potentially affected by the Matrixx decision, a brief review of the 
required elements of a cause of action under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 is 
necessary. 
A. Elements of a Cause of Action under § 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 
 
Section § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act48 makes it unlawful to employ any deceptive 
or manipulative device “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”  Although the 
statute does not provide a private express cause of action for its violation, such a right has been 
routinely recognized by the federal courts.49  SEC Rule 10b-5, promulgated pursuant to § 10(b), 
makes it unlawful: 
“(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.” 50 
Prior to the intervention of Congress, the pleading standards for securities fraud were not 
governed by the general pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), but by the 
                                                 
45 550 U.S. 544 (2007) 
46 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) 
47 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2010) 
48 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b) (2010). 
49 See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).   
50 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (2010).   
particularity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires that a plaintiff 
pleading common-law fraud “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or 
mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged 
generally”. 51However, in 1995, a legislative amendment to the Securities Exchange Act, the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act52enacted §21(D), which set forth several requirements 
for plaintiffs pleading a cause of action under § 10(b).  One requirement deals with the 
materiality requirement; the other with the scienter requirement.   
As to materiality, § 21(D) requires that the plaintiff in the complaint in any private 
securities fraud action alleging material misstatements or omissions “specify each statement 
alleged to have been misleading; the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading; and if an 
allegation regarding the statement or omissions is made on information and belief, the complaint 
shall state with particularity all facts upon which that belief is formed.”53  A court, in 
determining if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged materiality, will consider the information 
“holistically”54 of information in order to determine if there is “a substantial likelihood that the 
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the  reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”55 
As to scienter, the requirement is that, in any private action under the Exchange act in 
which the plaintiff “may recover money damages on proof that the defendant acted with a 
particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each such act or omission alleged to 
                                                 
51 Fed R. Civ. P. 9.  See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 319 (stating that, generally, “[prior to the enactment of the PSLRA, the 
sufficiency of a complaint for securities fraud was governed not by Rule 8, but by the heightened pleading standards 
set forth in Rule 9(b).”) 
52 CITE 
53 CITE 
54 Basic Cite 
55 TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976). 
violate [the Exchange Act], state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind.”56   
The meaning of “strong inference” was left undefined by the PSLRA.  However, it was 
clear that the intent of the PSLRA was to adopt a pleading standard stronger even than the 
Second Circuit’s existing pleading requirement, which was “[r]egarded as the most stringent 
pleading standard” then existing:  “[b]ecause the Conference Committee intends to strengthen 
existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit’s case law 
interpreting this standard.”57   
The Supreme Court considered the meaning of “strong inference” in Tellabs, Inc v. 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.58 The Court in Tellabs rejected the Seventh Circuits articulation of 
the term, stating that  
[i]t does not suffice that a reasonable factfinder could plausibly infer from the 
complaint’s allegations the requisite state of mind.  Rather, to determine whether a 
complaint’s scienter allegations can survive threshold inspection for sufficiency, a court 
governed by §21(D)(b)(2) must engage in a comparative evaluation; it must consider not 
only inferences urged by the plaintiff . . .but also competing inferences rationally drawn 
from the facts alleged. . . .To qualify as “strong” within the intendment of §21(D)(b)(2), 
we hold, an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it 
must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent 
intent.59 
Stating the requirement another way, the Court added that “A plaintiff alleging fraud in a 
§ 10(b) action must plead facts rendering an inference as least as likely as any plausible opposing 
inference.”60  This standard was the standard applied by the Court in Matrixx to the plaintiff’s 
scienter claims. 
                                                 
56 CITE, note also that this pleading standard supersedes the federal pleading standard for pleading fraud actions, see 
Fed R. Civ. P. 9.   
57 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Conference Committee CITE 
58 Tellabs Cite 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at X 
The PSLRA did not provide specific pleading standards for the remaining elements of a 
claim under §10(b).  In general, federal courts applied either the liberal pleading standards of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) to the other 
elements of such a claim.61  In recent years, a shift has occurred in general federal pleading 
standards due to the Court’s holdings in Twombly and Iqbal.  In light of this shift, the Court’s 
holding in Matrixx casts serious doubt upon whether the pleading standards for materiality and 
scienter, rather than being the “most stringent” standards in federal pleading, have instead 
become the easier elements of a plaintiff’s cause of action to plead satisfactorily.   
B.  Twombly and Iqbal alter the general federal pleading standard 
 
Prior to Twombly and Iqbal,62 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), requiring that every 
complaint “contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief” was interpreted as require only “notice” pleading in federal complaints.63 In the 
seminal case on the issue, Conley v. Gibson, the Supreme Court stated the “accepted rule that a 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that 
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”64 
The Court further elaborated that “all the Rules require is ‘a short and plaint statement of the 
                                                 
61 See, e.g., In Re Mut. Funds. Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 119-20 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Congress only addressed 
misrepresentations[,][fraud] and scienter in [the PSLRA], the other elements of a securities fraud claim are analyzed 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements do not govern our 
analysis of reliance or loss causation.”), see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (holding that 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) governs the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s pleading of loss causation).  See 
generally Jason N. Haycock, Pleading a Loss Cause: Resolving the Pleading Standard for the Element of Loss 
Causation in a Private Securities Fraud Claim and a Plaintiff’s Heavy Burden of Pleading it Under Iqbal, 60 Am. 
U. L. Rev. 173 (2010).   
62 Whimsically dubbed “Twiqbal” by some commentators. 
63 Fed R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).   
64 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).   
claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the ground upon 
which it rests.”65   
And such was the standard for the next half-century, with the Court rejecting any attempt by 
the lower federal courts to provide a heightened-pleading-standard gloss on the language of 
Conley.66 Even Dura Pharm., while appearing to establish a slightly higher standard for 
securities fraud plaintiffs in their pleading of loss causation, adhered to the language of Conley in 
its holding, stating only that a complaint that failed to allege that a share price, supposedly 
inflated by the defendants’ misrepresentations, fell after the truth was revealed, “failed [Conley’s] 
simple test.”67 
All of this changed with Twombly and Iqbal.  In Twombly, the majority of the Court held that 
plaintiffs in an anti-trust action had not sufficiently alleged conduct indicative of a conspiracy 
among the various defendants to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act.68 The Court 
stated that the Plaintiffs complaint, despite allegations of parallel conduct, did not contain 
“enough facts to state a claim for relief that [wa]s plausible on its face.”69  The Court explicitly 
rejected the language of Conley, stating that Conley’s “no set of facts” language “has earned its 
retirement” and “is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading 
standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 See, e.g.  Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993), and 
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facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”70 The Court articulated the new standard 
as requiring plaintiffs to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible”71  
After Twombly, some commentators expressed the hope or belief that the holding would be 
confined to anti-trust cases, who’s complexity, perhaps, demanded a heightened pleading 
standard in order to sort the strike suits from the valid ones.72  However, Iqbal made it clear that 
the Court’s “decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions.’”73   
Iqbal involved a Bivens action for violation of the First and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution.74  The Court in Iqbal expanded upon the line, enunciated in the footnote of 
Twombly, between the conclusory and the factual, stating that pleadings that “are no more than 
conclusions[] are not entitled to assumption of truth.”75  The Court thus separated conclusory 
allegations from allegations it found sufficiently grounded in fact before conducting an analysis 
of the complaint’s plausibility under Twombly.76 The Court concluded the plaintiff’s complaint, 
stripped of its “conclusory” allegations, did not “state a plausible entitlement to relief for 
unconstitutional discrimination.”77 
 In summary, the pleading standard for complaints plead under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that the plaintiff’s allegations first be grounded in facts rather than 
conclusory, and second that those allegations are plausible, rather than merely conceivable. 78 
Since this standard debuted, it almost immediately resulted in numerous products liability 
                                                 
70 Id. at 563.   
71 Id. at 570.  The court also suggested in a footnote that, in addition to the line between the conceivable and the 
plausible, a plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint must also cross “the line between the conclusory and the factual.”  
Id. at 557 n.5 
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1278 (2010).   
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75 Id. at X 
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complaints and class actions against, among others, drug manufacturers being dismissed at the 
pleading stage for lack of plausibility.79  
 But how does the Court’s decision in Matrixx, dealing as it does with the specific 
pleading requirements of the PSLRA, relate to the new general pleading standard enunciated by 
the Court in Twombly & Iqbal.  The next Part of this paper will discuss the Matrixx decision 
itself, and how the Court appears to have rendered the pleading requirement for materiality and 
scienter easier for plaintiffs to meet than if the Twombly/Iqbal standard were applied.   
III.    THE MATRIXX DECISION AND ANALYSIS 
 
At first blush, the Matrixx decision appears not to add much to the area of securities fraud 
jurisprudence.  After all, the Court expressly declined to adopt a new rule governing materiality 
and statistical significance, instead falling back on the same materiality inquiry articulated in 
TSC and Basic.80 But a close reading of the Court’s stated reasons for its holding reveals that the 
Court, deliberately or unconsciously, may in fact be “watering down” the pleading standard 
articulated by the PSLRA, and that a current analysis of the standard compared to the 
Twombly/Iqbal standard reveals that, far from being the most stringent standard in federal 
pleading, the requirements for pleading materiality and scienter may actually be easier to satisfy 
than the general federal pleading requirements under Rule 8, at least in the context of suits 
against drug manufacturers.   
A.  The Decision 
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1. Materiality Heading 
 
The alleged misstatements and/or omissions plead in the class’s master complaint are listed 
in Part I of this paper81.  Interestingly, despite the fact that materiality has its own pleading 
requirement, the Court referenced both Twombly and Iqbal in its reasoning, saying that it 
believed “that these allegations suffice to ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will 
reveal evidence’ satisfying the materiality requirement, and to ‘allo[w] the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”82   
The Court appeared to be engaging in the first part of a Twombly/Iqbal analysis of a pleading 
plead under Rule 8, that of identifying conclusory allegations and factual allegations in the 
complaint.  However, it also stated that “[v]iewing the allegations of the complaint as a whole” 
plaintiffs had alleged facts suggesting a significant risk to the commercial viability of Zicam.83  
The Court did not appear to engage in the kind of division into conclusions and factual 
allegations that Iqbal requires.  In fact, the Court’s only other reference to Iqbal comes at the 
beginning of the opinion, where it simply states that “[r]espondents’ consolidated amended 
complaint alleges the following facts, which the courts below properly assumed to be true” 
followed by a citation to Iqbal.84 This statement could be read as a statement that the Court was 
not performing a conclusory/factual analysis because the Ninth Circuit or the District Court 
already did so.   
The Ninth Circuit explicitly did not perform the sort of analysis required by Twombly/Iqbal 
(Iqbal being at the time slightly less than 2 months old).  The court specifically stated that “[i]n 
review the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, we accept the plaintiff’s 
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allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.”85 The District 
Court, further, did not apply Twombly or Iqbal for the simple reason that neither case had been 
decided at the time.86 
Neither court, nor the Supreme Court, was required to apply any rule 8 standard to plaintiffs’ 
allegations of material misstatements or omissions.  Why then, is the Supreme Court taking pains 
to state that the allegations of the plaintiffs satisfy Twombly and Iqbal?   Especially because, 
unlike a complaint that has been vetted by a court under Iqbal and stripped of conclusory 
allegations, the Court in Matrixx explicitly assumed all of the complaint’s allegations to be 
true.87  The District Court noted that the Plaintiff’s failed to allege that “during the class period, 
Defendants were presented with any evidence that the University of Colorado study was reliable, 
the methodology used, or that it was subject to peer review” and also appears to be the only 
Court to give any weight to the fact that defendant “conducted a double-blind study regarding 
Zicam and not a single case of anosmia was reported.”88 It is at least possible that a court 
analyzing some of the allegations taken as true by the Court, in conducting an analysis into each 
statements conclusory or factual nature, could find some of them to be conclusory, especially in 
light of a failure to allege specific details about the nature of the studies finding a link between 
anosmia and Zicam.  After all, in McAdams v. McCord89 illustrates how, in the words one 
commentator, “the distinction between legal conclusion and factual allegation is generally a 
matter of specificity and is difficult to distinguish.”90   
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In McCord, the Eighth Circuit, considering an appeal from a District Court dismissal of a 
securities fraud action for failure to sufficiently plead materiality and scienter, exercised its 
discretion to affirm the District Court on any basis supported by the record, and affirmed on the 
basis that the plaintiffs had not adequately plead the element of loss causation under Rule 
8(a)(2).91  The plaintiffs, investors in the defendant company, alleged that the defendant outside 
auditor made two statements that misrepresented the company’s overall financial condition, and 
that the plaintiffs were damaged when the truth emerged regarding the company’s condition 
when the company revised several financial statements.  The court found that the plaintiffs had 
failed to “state the value of UCAP’s stock when the investors made their investments, or its 
value right before, or right after, the need for the restatement was announced.”92 The lack of this 
information rendered the allegation “conclusory” in the court’s eyes.93   
The Court in Matrixx clearly, despite lip service to Twombly and Iqbal, performed a very 
different type of analysis in determining the materiality of the alleged misstatements of Matrixx.  
Which, of course, is appropriate, considering that expressly different pleading standards apply to 
materiality and scienter than the other elements of a § 10(b) claim.  Having concluded that the 
plaintiffs satisfied the requirement of alleging material misrepresentations or omissions, the 
Court then concluded that a reasonable investor would have found the information significant.  
The Court noted, based on its earlier reasoning that Matrixx was plausibly informed of a link 
between Zicam and anosmia, that “Matrixx had information indicating a significant risk to its 
leading revenue-generating product” and that Matrixx’s statements to the public had omitted 
“evidence of a biological link between Zicam’s key ingredient and anosmia” and that it had not 
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“conducted any studies of its own to disprove the link.”94  The Court concluded that the above-
mentioned facts were “material facts ‘necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”’95 
The Iqbal test and the PSLRA test for materiality seem to share a similar bipartite 
structure.  The first prongs of both tests seem to operate similarly—under Iqbal the plaintiff is 
required to plead sufficient factual content, whereas under the PSLRA and Rule 9 a plaintiff is 
required to plead “factual particularity.”  There appears to be no meaningful analytical 
distinction between the two first prongs when viewed from this level.96 
However, in light of the fact that the PSLRA standard is supposed to be “heightened”, it 
appears surprising that it may be easier for a plaintiff to satisfy the PSLRA standard than the 
Iqbal test.  Had the alleged misstatements and omissions in Matrixx been considered under Iqbal, 
with each allegation considered separately to determine if it was based in fact or merely 
conclusory, some of the allegations may have been viewed as conclusory and stricken from the 
Court’s analysis in the second prong.   But under the rules of TSC and Basic, the Court 
considered the Matrixx allegations holistically, taking all allegations as true without this sort of 
analysis taking place.   
Satisfying the second prong of Iqbal, plausibility, may prove significantly harder than 
satisfying the test for materiality from TSC and Basic.  Particularity in pleading is a necessary, 
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but not sufficient, precursor to plausibility.  To use the example of loss causation, a court may be 
willing to consider alternative plausible explanations for a plaintiff’s loss, and that a pleading of 
loss causation must not only be plausible, but at least as plausible as alternative explanations.97  
Since there are often a multitude of factors that have potential impact on an individual’s loss, it 
can be difficult to point to a particular misstatement or omission as the cause of that loss.98  It is 
at least possible that a plaintiff could have a harder time clearing the hurdle of Iqbal’s second 
prong than he or she would have in convincing a court that a reasonable investor would have 
found the missing or misrepresented information relevant.   
B. Scienter Heading 
 
The Court in Matrixx dealt with the defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s had not 
adequately alleged facts sufficient to support the “strong inference” that it acted recklessly or 
knowingly with respect to the alleged misrepresentations.   Not surprisingly, the Court rejected a 
bright-line rule that an allegation of statistical significance is required to establish such an 
inference.99  It also rejected the defendant’s proposal that “the most obvious inference is that 
petitioners did not disclose the [reports] simply because petitioners believed they were far too 
few . . . to indicate anything meaningful about adverse reactions to use of Zicam.”100  This 
response may have been due to the cursory way that Matrixx itself argued that the plaintiffs had 
failed to sufficiently allege scienter; the Brief for Respondents devotes just two pages to the 
issue.101 
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The Court appears to draw the inference from Matrixx’s actions concerning statements 
being made about its product:  “[t]hese allegations, ‘taken collectively’ give rise to a ‘cogent and 
compelling’ inference that Matrixx elected not to disclose the reports of adverse events not 
because it believed they were meaningless but because it understood their likely effect on the 
market.”102 This is interesting, because it would seem that the inference at issue was whether or 
not Matrixx believed that the reports actually indicating anything meaningful about adverse 
reactions to Zicam.  It seems logical that a company might feel compelled to respond to even 
groundless statements in the marketplace concerning its products, irrespective of its belief in the 
reliability of any negative reports it has received.   
The Court further seemed to place great weight on the actions taken by Matrixx to 
investigate the information it had received: “Matrixx was sufficiently concerned about the 
information it received that it informed Linschoten that it had hired a consultant to review the 
product, asked Linschoten to participate in animal studies, and convened a panel of physicians 
and scientists in response to Dr. Jafek’s presentation.”103  There appear to be two plausible 
inferences that could be drawn from the above information: one, that Matrixx investigates 
complaints about its products and attempts to gather scientific data to determine if there is 
actually a problem before disclosing information, or two, that Matrixx attempted to discredit the 
reports with statements in the marketplace regardless of their truth.  One of Matrixx’s amici, the 
Washington Legal Foundation, noted this very fact, stating that “the most cogent inference . . . is 
that [Matrixx] delayed releasing information regarding anosmia complaints in order to provide 
itself an opportunity to carefully review all evidence regarding any link between Zicam and 
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anosmia.”104 The Court dealt with this opposing inference cursorily, saying that while touch an 
inference may be the most cogent inference in some cases, the “misleading nature of Matrixx’s 
press release” was sufficient to render the inference of scienter at least as compelling as the 
alternative inference.105 
However, what exactly was misleading about the press release?  The Court faults Matrixx 
for making the statement that “suggested” that scientific studies had confirmed Zicam did not 
cause anosmia when it had not conducted any studies on the Zicam-anosmia link and the current 
state of the scientific evidence was insufficient to determine if a causal link in fact existed.106  
But Matrixx reported that two clinical trials had not show links to anosmia, not that it had 
specifically designed its studies to determine a causal connection between Zicam and anosmia.  
After the class period ended, Matrixx convened a panel of scientists to determine the current 
state of the scientific evidence on smell disorders, and upon learning that in the opinion of that 
panel there was insufficient evidence to determine if zinc gluconate use was linked to anosmia, it 
filed a Form 8-K with the SEC making that same statement.107 
The Court did not specifically mention it, but the Ninth Circuit found fault with Matrixx 
for issuing the February 2, 2004 press release containing the statement  “ Matrixx believes 
statements alleging that intranasal Zicam products caused Anosmia . . . are completely 
unfounded and misleading.”108  The court said that the release was inaccurate because by that 
date, it could be strongly inferred that Matrixx knew that “the statements alleging a link a 
between Zicam and anosmia were not ‘completely unfounded and misleading.”109 But that is not 
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what Matrixx said.  Rather it stated that the statements alleging that Zicam was the cause of 
anosmia were completely misleading and unfounded.  The Ninth Circuit also characterized the 
statement that Matrixx was “not aware of an FDA inquiry” as denying than the FDA was 
investigating Zicam.110 
All of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, or part, or none, may have informed the Court’s 
characterization of the press release as “misleading.”  The point is simply this:  Matrixx made a 
series of statements, none of them obviously untrue at the time they were made, and all of which 
were susceptible to an inference of innocent as well as guilty behavior.  Added to this is the 
obvious fact that this opinion had yet to be written, and Carter-Wallace I & II were available to 
support the idea that Matrixx felt it had no duty to disclose the adverse event reports absent 
statistical significance.  In fact, recent caselaw recognizes that a drug and device manufacturer 
that delays in addressing adverse reports while conducting studies to confirm the information 
acts prudently, rather than deceptively. 111 
The Tellabs standard requires that the inference of scienter be “at least as compelling as 
any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”112 In the case of equal-strength 
opposing influences, the tie goes to scienter.  How would these allegations have fared if analyzed 
under the Twombly/Iqbal pleading framework of Rule 8?   
 
 
C. The Complaint in Matrixx may have failed the plausibility analysis required by Twombly 
and  Iqbal 
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The pleadings in Twombly, once the Court had discounted the “few stray statements that 
sp[oke] directly of an agreement [to restrain trade] as “merely legal conclusions” alleged conduct 
on the part of the defendant companies that could have been the result of either parallel conduct 
or an agreement to restrain trade.113 The Court, in dealing with each allegation, stated its belief 
that each of the defendants’ alleged conspiratorial actions could have been explained by lawful, 
independent goals rather than by a conspiracy.    The opinion is replete with phrases such as 
“natural, unilateral reaction to each  [defendant] intent on keep its regional dominance”, “there is 
no reason to infer that the [defendants] had agreed among themselves to do what was only 
natural anyway” and in fact that the behavior was so natural that to allow the plaintiff’s 
allegations to suffice would insure that “pleading a [Sherman Act] violation against almost any 
group of competing businesses would be a sure thing.”114   
The court noted the “obvious alternative explanation” that the companies independently 
chose not to compete as dictated by economic pressures rather than by conspiracy.115  The 
plaintiff in Twombly, of course, failed to “nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to 
plausible.”116 It appears from the analysis of the plaintiffs allegations conducted by the Court, 
however, that this “nudge” did not occur because, at least in part, of alternate inferences that 
could be drawn from the facts alleged. 
Similarly, the Iqbal Court considered plausible alternate explanations when considering 
the essentially redacted (because stripped of “conclusory” allegations) complaint before it.  The 
Court concluded that plaintiffs had not alleged that the defendants had purposefully adopted a 
policy of classifying post-September-11 detainees as “of high interest” because of their race, 
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religion, or national origin, in light of an “obvious alternate explanation” that “the Nation's top 
law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep 
suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the suspects could be cleared of 
terrorist activity.”117 
It is at least possible that a court applying the framework of Twombly and Iqbal would 
have come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs pleading of scienter in Matrixx did not pass 
muster.  Although the Iqbal Court stated that it was applying a pleading standard that was “less 
rigid” than the Rule 9(b) particularity standard, it is not at all clear that the standard is actually 
less rigid as applied.118  Justice Souter, who wrote the Twombly opinion, dissented in Iqbal.  His 
principal complaint with the majority’s reasoning was that the factual statements that were 
dismissed as “conclusory” were read in isolation, rather than in the context of the complaint as a 
whole.119  Justice Souter noted the Twombly Court interpreted the complaint before it as a whole 
and only excluded from the analysis those statements that were restatements of allegations found 
elsewhere in the complaint, that did not add new facts to the complaint.120  The Iqbal Court also 
provided no guidance for the determination of which allegations were conclusory.121 
The Tellabs standard applied by the Court in Matrixx makes it clear that “the court’s job 
is not to scrutinize each allegation in isolation but to assess all the allegations holistically.”122 
This stands in marked contrast to the Twombly/Iqbal approach of first analyzing the allegations 
individually to determine their factual or conclusory nature and then conducting a plausibility 
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analysis.  Besides this, lower Courts following the lead of Twombly and Iqbal have shown their 
willingness to grant motions to dismiss when an alternate explanation exists that is as plausible 
as the allegation of wrongful conduct.123   
Simply put, the complaint at issue in Matrixx may well have failed to survive a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 8(a)(2), despite surviving under the so-called “heightened” requirements of 
Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA.  To begin with, the complaint, rather than being viewed as a totality, 
would have had each allegation separately analyzed to determine whether it was conclusory or 
factual.  Although the factual statements concerning Matrixx’s statements in the marketplace 
would obviously survive this prong, the totality of the complaint may well have been altered.  
Following this, it would seem possible that a court could conclude, in light of strong alternative 
inferences, that the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged either materiality or scienter.  The 
inference is available, for example, that a reasonable investor would not find a handful of 
adverse event reports significant; after all, the FDA itself cautions against using “raw” (not 
statistically analyzed) adverse event reports to determine scienter.124   
But perhaps the materiality allegations would have sufficed under Rule 8.  After all, the 
Court stated that the facts alleged in the complaint plausibly suggested that the conclusions 
drawn by Dr. Jafek and Linschoten’s conclusions were based on reliable evidence of a causal 
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link between Zicam and anosmia.125  But again, this conclusion was made from viewing the 
complaint as a whole.   
Notwithstanding a finding of materiality, a court analyzing the scienter allegations under 
the Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard could easily have dismissed the complaint for failing to 
plausibly allege this element.  The inference that Matrixx delayed releasing information about 
anosmia until it had reviewed all of the evidence is a strong one; so too is the inference that, in 
light of the lack of statistical significance and existing precedent (both judicial and FDA-
promulgated) at the time of the complaint, Matrixx thought the information was non-material, 
speculative, or inconclusive, and thus not requiring disclosure.126 These inferences could well be 
“obvious alternative explanations” sufficient to defeat a plaintiff’s claim under Twombly and 
Iqbal. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Court’s decision in Matrixx may signify a watering-down of the heightened 
standards for the pleading of materiality and scienter in §10(b) actions; at the very least, it 
indicates that a drug manufacturer is not safe from suit by its investors because the adverse event 
reports it has received are not statistically significant.  But this decision, viewed in comparison 
with the application of general federal pleading standards under Twombly and Iqbal, raises the 
question: is the pleading standard for 10(b) actions, whether watered-down by the Court in 
Matrixx or not, any higher than the general pleading standard?  It appears that it may actually be 
easier for an investor who has lost money in a drug manufacturer’s securities to survive a motion 
to dismiss on his suit than it is for a person injured by that same manufacturer’s products to bring 
suit, because the investor enjoys having his complaint analyzed as a whole and wins if the 
                                                 
125 Matrixx, 563 U.S., slip op. at 17 fn 12. 
126 Basic, 485 U.S. at 231(quoting TSC Indus. 426 U.S. at 448)(“ Information need not be disclosed that is 
inconclusive, speculative, or ‘of dubious significance.’”). 
competing inferences tie, whereas the injured person will have his each allegation scrutinized in 
isolation, and then have a redacted version of his complaint analyzed in such a way that a 
competing inference of innocent behavior may well defeat his claim.   
 The Court’s decision in Matrixx may well lead to less dismissals at the pleading stage of 
§ 10(b) claims against drug manufacturers or defendants who rely (or claim to rely) on statistical 
significance in determining whether to disclose information to investors.  At the very least, it 
strips defendants of the defense of statistical insignificance.  More broadly, it suggests that 
perhaps the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA are no longer higher than the general 
federal pleading burden, and may even, perhaps, be lower.   
 
 
 
 
 
